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Abstract 
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a 
central problem in multiagent systems. The 
key difficulty is that the agents may report 
their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de­
sign is the art of designing the rules of the 
game so that the agents are motivated to re­
port their preferences truthfully and a (so­
cially) desirable outcome is chosen. We pro­
pose an approach where a mechanism is au­
tomatically created for the preference ag­
gregation setting at hand. This has sev­
eral advantages, but the downside is that 
the mechanism design optimization problem 
needs to be solved anew each time. Focus­
ing on settings where side payments are not 
possible, we show that the mechanism design 
problem is N ?-complete for deterministic 
mechanisms. This holds both for dominant­
strategy implementation and for Bayes-Nash 
implementation. We then show that if we al­
low randomized mechanisms, the mechanism 
design problem becomes tractable. In other 
words, the coordinator can tackle the compu­
tational complexity introduced by its uncer­
tainty about the agents' preferences by mak­
ing the agents face additional uncertainty. 
This comes at no loss, and in some cases at 
a gain, in the (social) objective. 
1 Introduction 
In multiagent settings, agents generally have different 
preferences, and it is of central importance to be able 
to aggregate these, i.e., to pick a socially desirable out­
come from a set of outcomes. Such outcomes could be 
potential presidents, joint plans, allocations of goods 
or resources, etc. For example, voting mechanisms 
constitute an important class of preference aggrega­
tion methods. 
• This material is based upon work supported by NSF 
under CAREER Award IRI-9703122, Grant IIS-9800994, 
ITR IIS-0081246, and ITR IIS-0121678. 
The key problem is the following uncertainty. The co­
ordinator of the preference aggregation generally does 
not know the agents' preferences a priori. Rather, the 
agents report their preferences to the coordinator. U n­
fortunately, in this setting, most naive preference ag­
gregation mechanisms suffer from manipulability. An 
agent may have an incentive to misreport its prefer­
ences in order to mislead the mechanism into selecting 
an outcome that is more desirable to the agent than 
the outcome that would be selected if the agent re­
vealed its preferences truthfully. Manipulation is an 
undesirable phenomenon because preference aggrega­
tion mechanisms are tailored to aggregate preferences 
in a socially desirable way, and if the agents reveal 
their preferences insincerely, a socially undesirable out­
come may be chosen. 
Manipulability is a pervasive problem across pref­
erence aggregation mechanisms. A seminal nega­
tive result, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, shows 
that under any nondictatorial preference aggregation 
scheme, if there are at least 3 possible outcomes, there 
are preferences under which an agent is better off re­
porting untruthfully [9, 19]. (A preference aggregation 
scheme is called dictatorial if one of the agents dictates 
the outcome no matter how the others vote.) 
With software agents, the algorithms they use for de­
ciding how to report their preferences must be coded 
explicitly. Given that the reporting algorithm needs 
to be designed only once (by an expert), and can be 
copied to large numbers of agents (even ones represent­
ing unsophisticated humans), it is likely that manipu­
lative preference reporting will increasingly become an 
issue, unmuddied by irrationality, emotions, etc. 
What the coordinator would like to do is to design a 
preference aggregation mechanism so that 1) the self­
interested agents are motivated to report their prefer­
ences truthfully, and 2) the mechanism chooses an out­
come that is desirable from the perspective of some so­
cial objective. This is the classic setting of mechanism 
design in game theory. In mechanism design, there 
are two different types of uncertainty: the coordina­
tor's uncertainty about the agents' preferences, and 
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the agents' uncertainty about each others' preferences 
(which can affect how each agent tries to manipulate 
the mechanism). 
Mechanism design provides us with a variety of care­
fully crafted definitions of what it means for a mecha­
nism to be nonmanipulable, and goals to pursue under 
this constraint (e.g., social welfare maximization). It 
also provides us with some general mechanisms which, 
under· certain assumptions, are nonmanipulable and 
socially desirable (among other properties). The up­
side of these mechanisms is that they do not rely 
on (even probabilistic) information about the agents' 
preferences (e.g., the V ickrey-Groves-Clarke mecha­
nism [5, 10, 20]), or they can be easily applied to any 
probability distribution over the preferences (e.g., the 
dAGVA mechanism [1, 7]). The downside is that these 
mechanisms only work under very restrictive assump­
tions, the most common of which is to assume that 
the agents can make side payments and have quasilin­
ear utility functions. The quasilinearity assumption is 
quite unrealistic. It means that each agent is risk neu­
tral, does not care about what happens to its friends or 
enemies, and values money independently of all other 
attributes of the outcome. Also, in many voting set­
tings, the use of side payments would not be politi­
cally feasible. Furthermore, among software agents, it 
might be more desirable to construct mechanisms that 
do not rely on the ability to make payments. 
In this paper, we propose that the mechanism be de­
signed automatically for the specific preference aggre­
gation problem at hand. We formulate the mecha­
nism design problem as an optimization problem. The 
input is characterized by the number of agents, the 
agents' possible types (preferences), and the coordi­
nator's prior probability distributions over the agents' 
types. The output is a nonmanipulable mechanism 
that is optimal with respect to some (social) objective. 
This approach has three advantages over the classic 
approach of designing general mechanisms. First, it 
can be used even in settings that do not satisfy the as­
sumptions of the classical mechanisms. Second, it may 
yield better mechanisms (in terms of stronger non­
manipulability guarantees and/ or better social out­
comes) than the classical mechanisms. Third, it may 
allow one to circumvent impossibility results (such as 
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) which state that 
there is no mechanism that is desirable across all pref­
erences. When the mechanism is designed to the set­
ting at hand, it does not matter that it would not work 
on preferences beyond those in that setting. 
However, this approach requires the mechanism de­
sign optimization problem to be solved anew for each 
preference aggregation setting. In this paper we study 
how hard this computational problem is under the two 
most common nonmanipulability requirements: domi­
nant strategies, and Bayes-Nash equilibrium [16]. We 
will study preference aggregation settings where side 
payments are not an option. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 3 we define the deterministic mechanism design 
problem, where the mechanism coordinator is con­
strained to deterministically choose an outcome on the 
basis of the preferences reported by the agents. We 
then show that this problem is NP-complete for the 
two most common concepts of nonmanipulability. In 
Section 4 we generalize this to the randomized mech­
anism design problem, where the mechanism coordi­
nator may stochastically choose an outcome on the 
basis of the preferences reported by the agents. (On 
the side, we demonstrate that randomized mechanisms 
may be strictly more efficient than deterministic ones.) 
We then show that this problem is solvable by linear 
programming for both concepts of nonmanipulability. 
2 The setting 
Before we define the computational problem of mecha­
nism design, we should justify our focus on nonmanip­
ulable mechanisms. After all, it is not immediately ob­
vious that there are no manipulable mechanisms that, 
even when agents report their types strategically and 
hence sometimes untruthfully, still reach better out­
comes (according to whichever objective we use) than 
any nonmanipulable mechanism. Additionally, given 
our computational focus, we should also be concerned 
that manipulable mechanisms that do as well as non­
manipulable ones may be easier to find. It turns out 
that we need not worry about either of these points: 
given any mechanism, we can quickly construct a non­
manipulable mechanism whose performance is exactly 
identical. For given such a mechanism, we can build an 
interface layer between the agent and this mechanism. 
The agents input (some report of) their preferences (or 
types) into the interface layer; subsequently, the inter­
face layer inputs the types that the agents would have 
strategically reported if their types were as declared 
into the original mechanism, and the resulting out­
come is the outcome of the new mechanism. Since the 
interface layer acts "strategically on each agent's best 
behalf", there is never an incentive to report falsely to 
the interface layer; and hence, the types reported by 
the interface layer are the strategic types that would 
have been reported without the interface layer, so the 
results are exactly as they would have been with the 
original mechanism. This argument (or at least the 
existential part of it, if not the constructive) is known 
in the mechanism design literature as the revelation 
principle [16]. Given this, we can focus on truthful 
mechanisms in the rest of the paper. 
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We first define a preference aggregation setting. 
Definition 1 A preference aggregation setting con­
sists of a set of outcomes 0, a set of agents A with 
IAI = N ,  and for each agent: 
• A set of types ei; 
• A probability distribution Pi over e i; 1 
• A utility function ui : e i x 0 --> lR; 2 
These are all common knowledge. However, each 
agent's type Bi E e i is private information. 
Though this follows standard game theory nota­
tion [16], the fact that agents have both utility func­
tions and types is perhaps confusing. The types en­
code the various possible preferences that agents may 
turn out to have, and the agents' types are not known 
by the coordinator. The utility functions are common 
knowledge, but the agent's type is a parameter in the 
agent's utility function. So, the utility of agent i is 
ui(Bi, o), where o E 0 is the outcome and gi is the 
agent's type. 
3 Deterministic mechanisms 
We now formally define a deterministic mechanism. 
Definition 2 Given a preference aggregation setting, 
a deterministic mechanism is a function that, given 
any vector of reported types, produces a single outcome. 
That is, it is a function 0: e 1 X e2 X . . •  X eN-+ 0. 
A solution concept is some definition of what it means 
for a mechanism to be nonmanipulable. We now 
present the two most common solution concepts. They 
are the ones analyzed in this paper. 
Definition 3 Given a preference aggregation setting, 
a mechanism is said to implement its outcome func­
tion in dominant strategies if truthtelling is always op­
timal, no matter what types the other agents report. 
For a deterministic mechanism, this means that for 
any i E A, for any type vector (B1, 82, • . •  , gi, ... ,BN) E 
e1 X e2 X . . . X e i X • . . X eN 1 and for any 
{ji E e i, we have ui(Bi,o(B\B2, . . .  , e i, ... ,eN)) 2: 
i 1 2 "i N Ui ( B 'o( B 'B ' ... 'e ' . . .  'B ) ) . 
1This assumes that the agents' types are drawn inde­
pendently. If this were not the case, the input to the 
mechanism design algorithm would include a joint prob­
ability distribution over the agents' types instead. All of 
the results of this paper apply to that setting as well. 
2Throughout the paper we allow the utility functions, 
objective functions, and goals in the input to be real­
valued. This makes the usual assumption of a computing 
framework that can handle real numbers. If that is not 
available, our results hold if the inputs are rational num­
bers. 
Dominant strategy implementation is very robust. It 
does not rely on the prior probability distributions be­
ing (commonly) known, or the types being private in­
formation. Furthermore, each agent is motivated to 
report truthfully even if the other agents report un­
truthfully, for example due to irrationality. 
The second most prevalent solution concept in mech­
anism design, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, does not have 
any of these robustness benefits. Often there is a trade­
off between the robustness of the solution concept and 
the social welfare (or some other goal) that we expect 
to attain, so both concepts are worth investigating. 
Definition 4 Given a preference aggregation setting, 
a mechanism is said to implement its outcome func­
tion in Bayes-N ash equilibrium if truthtelling is al­
ways optimal as long as the other agents report 
truthfully. For a deterministic mechanism, this 
means that for any i E A, and for any Bi, {ji E 
e i, we have Ee-i (ui(Bi' o(B1' 82' ... 'ei, ... 'BN))) ::::: 
i 1 2 Ai N E9-,(ui(B,o(B,B, . .. ,e, ... ,B ))). (Here Ee-' 
means the expectation taken over the types of all agents 
except i ,  according to their true type distributions Pi.) 
We are now ready to define the computational problem 
that we study. 
Definition 5 (DETERMINISTIC­
MECHANISM-DESIGN) We are given a 
preference aggregation setting, a solution concept, and 
an objective function g: e1 X e2 X . . .  X en X 0 -t JR 
with a goal G. We are asked whether there exists a de­
terministic mechanism for the preference aggregation 
setting which 
• satisfies the given solution concept, and 
• attains the goal, i.e., 
E(g(B\B2, ... ,BN,o(B\B2, ... ,BN))) > G. 
(Here the expectation is taken over the types of 
all the agents, according to the distributions Pi.) 
One common objective function is the social welfare 
function g(B1, 82, . . •  , gN, o) = 2:: ui(Bi, o). iEA 
If the number N of agents is unbounded, specifying 
an outcome function o will require exponential space, 
and in this case it is per haps not surprising that com­
putational complexity becomes an issue even for the 
decision variant of the problem given here. However, 
we will demonstrate NP-completeness even in the case 
where the number of agents is fixed at 2, and g is 
restricted to be the social welfare function, for both 
solution concepts. We begin with dominant strategy 
implementation: for this, we will reduce from the NP­
complete INDEPENDENT-SET problem [8]. 
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Definition 6 (INDEPENDENT-SET) We are 
given a graph (V, E) and a goal K. We are asked 
whether there exists a subset S <;; V, I Sf = K such 
that for any i, j E S, (i, j) tic E. 
Theorem 1 2-agent DETERMINISTIC­
MECHANISM-DESIGN with dominant strategies 
implementation {DMDDS) is NP-complete, even with 
the social welfare function as the objective function. 
Proof: To show that the problem is in N P, we ob­
serve that specifiying an outcome function here re­
quires only the specification of [81[ x [82[ outcomes, 
and given such an outcome function we can ver­
ify whether it meets our requirements in polynomial 
time. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbi­
trary INDEPENDENT-SET instance to the follow­
ing DMDDS instance. There are 2 agents, whose 
type sets are as follows: 81 = {Bi, B�, ... , e;.} and 
82 = { Br, B�, ... , B�}, each with a uniform distribu­
tion. For every pair i, j (1 ::; i ::; n and 1 ::; j ::; n), 
there are the following outcomes: if i = j, we have off 
and o{;; if i -j. j, and (i, j) is not an edge in the graph, 
we have Oij; if it is an edge in the graph, we have o}j 
and o;j. The utility functions are as follows: 
• u1(B},o{[) = u2(BJ,o];) = 2; 
• u1(B},ofJ,) = u2(BJ,o{{) = 2 fori -j. k and j -j.l; 
• u1(B},o{;) = u2(B],oyj) = 1; 
• u1(B},ofk) = u2(BJ,oh) = -5n2 fori#- k and 
j -1- l; 
• u1(B},o;j) = u2(BJ,o;j) = 2 fori -j. j, (i, j) tic E; 
• u1(B},ok1) = u2(BJ,okl) = -5n2 fork -j.l, (k, l) tic 
E, i -j. k and j -j. l; 
• u1(B},o}j) = u2(BJ,orj) = 5n2 fori -1- j, (i, j) E 
E; 
• u1(B},oll) 
u2(B], o�1) 
and j -j. l. 
u2(B],ol1) u1(B},o�1) 
-5n2 for k -j. l, (k, 1) E E, i #- k 
Finally, we set G 
2m(5n2+1)+2(n-K)+4K +4(n2-2m-n) nr 
n' vve now pro-
ceed to show that the two problem instances are 
equivalent. 
First suppose there is a solution to the 
INDEPENDENT-SET instance, that is, a subset 
S of V of size K such that for any i, j E S, (i, j) tic E. 
Let the outcome function be as follows: 
• o(B1 82) = oH if i E S· t ' t tt ' 
• o(B1 82) = oL if i n S· t ' t tt ?=- ' 
• o(B}, BJ) = o;j if i #- j, (i, j) tic E; 
• o(B},BJ) = oL if i #- j, (i, j) E E, and j E S; 
• o( B}, BJ) = orj otherwise. 
First we show that this mechanism is incentive com­
patible. We first demonstrate that agent 1 never has 
an incentive to misreport. Suppose agent 1 's true type 
is B} and agent 2 is reporting BJ. Then agent 1 never 
has an incentive to instead report Bl with k -j. i, k -j. j, 
since this will lead to the selection of Ok j, olj, or o�j, 
all of which give agent 1 utility -5n2. What about 
reporting BJ instead (when i -j. j)? If j tic S, this will 
lead to utility -5n2 for agent 1, so in this case there is 
no incentive to do so. If j E S, this will lead to utility 
2 for agent 1. However, if (i, j) tic E, reporting truth­
fully will also give agent 1 utility 2; and if (i,j) E E, 
then since j E S, reporting truthfully will in fact give 
agent 1 utility 5n2. It follows that again, there is no 
incentive to misreport. To show that agent 2 has no 
incentive to misreport, we apply the exact same argu­
ment as for agent 1: the only claim we need to prove 
in order to make this work is that if i -j. j, ( i, j) E E, 
and i E S, then o(B}, BJl = orj· All that is necessary 
to show is that in this case, j tic S. But this follows 
immediately from the fact that there are no edges be­
tween elements in S, since i E S and ( i, j) E E. Hence, 
we have established incentive compatibility. All that 
is left to show is that we reach the goal. Suppose 
the agents' types are B} and BJ. If ( i, j) is an edge, 
which happens with probability �, we get a social 
welfare of 5n2 + 1. If i = j and i tic S, which hap­
pens with probability n:;.,X , we get a social welfare of 
2. If i = j and i E S, which happens with probability 
!fr, we get a social welfare of 4. Finally, if i -j. j and 
(i, j) is not an edge, which happens with probability 
n'-�m-n, we get a social welfare of 4. Adding up all 
the terms we find that the goal is exactly satisfied. 
So there is a solution to the DMDDS instance. Now 
suppose the DMDDS instance has a solution, that is, 
a function o satisfying the desired properties. Sup­
pose there are r1 distinct vectors (p, B},, Bf,) such that 
up(Bf", o(B},, B[, )) = 5n2 (that is, r1 cases where some­
one gets the very large payoff) and r2 distinct vectors 
(p, B},, BI,) such that up( Bfp, o( B},, Bf,)) = -5n2. Let r = r1 - r2. Then, since the highest other payoff that 
can be reached is 2, the expected social welfare can 
r(5n2)+4n2 be at most n� . But the goal is greater than 
2mi�n'), and since by assumption o reaches this goal, 
we have r 2': 2m. Of course, we can only achieve a 
payoff of 5n2 with outcomes oL or orj• However, if it 
is the case that o(O}, BJ) E {ol1, o�1} fork#- i or l #- j, 
one of the agents in fact receives a utility of -5n2, 
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and the contribution of this outcome to r can be at 
most 0. It follows that there must be at least 2m pairs 
(B}, BJ) whose outcome is o}j or OTj · But this is possi­
ble only if ( i, j) is an edge, and there are only 2m such 
pairs. It follows that whenever ( i, j) is an edge, of; or 
OTj is chosen. Now, we setS= {i: o(e},el) = o{f}. 
First we show that S is an independent set. Suppose 
not: i.e., i, j E Sand (i, j) E E. Consider o(Bf,BJ). 
If it is o}j, then agent 2 receives 1 in this scenario 
and has an incentive to misreport its type as BT, since 
o( e}, BT) = o{[, which gives it utility 2. On the other 
hand, if it is o;j, then agent 1 receives 1 in this sce­
nario and has an incentive to misreport its type as BJ, 
since o( Bj, BJ) = ofJ , which gives it utility 2. But this 
contradicts incentive compatibility. Finally, we show 
that S has at least K elements. Suppose the agents' 
types are e} and e;. If ( i, j) is an edge, which happens 
with probability �, we get a social welfare of 5n2 + 1. 
If i = j and i tf. S, which happens with probability 
n��SI, we get a social welfare of at most 2. If i = j 
and i E S, which happens with probability W, we get 
a social welfare of 4. Finally, if i # j and ( i, j) is not 
an edge, which happens with probability n'-�m-n, we 
get a social welfare of at most 4. Adding up all the 
terms we find that we get a social welfare of at most 2m(5n'+1)+2(n-ISI)2+4ISI+4(n'-
2m-n). But this must be n 
at least G = 
2m(5n2+1)+2(n-K)+4K+4(n2-2m-n). It n 
follows that lSI :::0: K. So there is a solution to the 
INDEPENDENT-SET instance. • 
We now move on to Bayes-Nash implementation. For 
this, we will reduce from the NP-complete KNAP­
SACK problem [8]. 
Definition 7 (KNAPSACK) We are given a set I 
of m pairs of (nonnegative) integers (wi, vi), a con­
straint C > 0 and a goal D > 0. We are asked whether 
there exists a subset S s;; I such that :2:: Wj :S: C and 
:2:: Vj:::: D. jES 
jES 
Theorem 2 2-agent DETERMINISTIC­
MECHANISM-DESIGN with Bayes-Nash imple­
mentation (DMDBN) is NP-complete, even with the 
social welfare function as the objective function. 
Proof: To show that the problem is in NP, we ob­
serve that specifiying an outcome function here re­
quires only the specification of 1811 x 1821 outcomes, 
and given such an outcome function we can verify 
whether it meets our requirements in polynomial time. 
To show that it is NP-hard, we reduce an arbitrary 
KNAPSACK instance to the following DMDBN in­
stance. Let W = L Wj and V = L Vj. There are 
jEI jEI 
m + 2 outcomes: 01, 02, ... , Om, Om+ 1, Om+2. We have 
81 = {Bi,Bi, ... , e]n}, where ej occurs with proba­
bility W; and 82 = { Br, en, where each of these 
types occurs with probability �· The utility func­
tions are as follows: for all j, ul(ej,oj) = c;; + 1)W; 
u1(Bj, Om+2) = -W; and u1 is 0 everywhere else. Fur­
thermore, u2(Bf,Om+l) = W; u2(Bf,Om+2) = W- C; 
u2(B�,om+2) = W(2V + 1); and u2 is 0 everywhere 
else. We set G = WV + w tD. We now proceed to 
show that the two problem instances are equivalent. 
First suppose there is a solution to the KNAPSACK 
instance, that is, a subset S of I such that :2:: Wj ::; C 
jES 
and :2:: Vj :::0: D. Then let the outcome function be as 
jES 
follows: o( BJ, Bfl = Oj if j E S, o( BJ, Bi) = Om+ 1 oth­
erwise; and for all j, o( eJ, e�) = Om+2· First we show 
that truthtelling is a BNE. Clearly, agent 1 never has 
an incentive to misrepresent its type, since if agent 2 
has type e�, the type that 1 reports makes no differ­
ence; and if agent 2 has type Br, misrepresenting its 
type will lead to utility at most 0 for agent 1, whereas 
truthful reporting will give it utility at least 0. It is 
also clear that agent 2 has no incentive to misrepre­
sent its type when its type is e�. W hat if agent 2 
has type Bi? Reporting truthfully will give it utility 
:2:: 1$-W = :2:: Wj :::0: W- C, whereas reporting jEl-S jEI-8 
e� instead will give it utility W-C. So there is no in­
centive for agent 2 to misrepresent its type in this case, 
either. Now, we show that the expected social welfare 
attains the goal. W ith probability � agent 2 has type 
e� and the social welfare is W(2V +1)-W = 2WV. On 
the other hand, if agent 2 has type e?, the expected 
social welfare is :2:: 1$-W + L 1$-((:' + 1)W) = 
jEI -S jES ' 
W + :2:: Vj :::0: W + D. So, the total expected social 
jES 
welfare is greater or equal to 2wv'\;W+D =G. Hence, 
the DMDBN instance has a solution. 
Now suppose the DMDBN instance has a solution, 
that is, a function o satisfying the desired proper­
ties. First suppose that there exists a Bj such that 
o( eJ, eD # Om+2. The social welfare in this case can 
be at most ( 22 + 1)W < WV (since Wj is a non-w, 
negative integer). Now, the event (Bj, B�) occurs with 
probability at least 2tv (again, since Wj is a nonneg­
ative integer), and it follows that the probability of 
an event with social welfare 2WV occuring is at most 
w;1. (For this can happen only when agent 2 has type 
e�.) It follows that the maximal contribution to the ex­
pected social welfare that we can expect from the cases 
where agent 2 has type e� is 2tv WV + �w 12WV = 
(W - �) V. Additionally, it is easy to see that the 
maximal contribution to the expected social welfare 
108 CONITZER & SANDHOLM UAI2002 
that we can expect from the cases where agent 2 has 
type r is � I:; 1\7(;\';;- + l)W = �( W + V). It follows 
that the total expected social welfare can be no more 
than (W- �)V + �(W + V) = WV + �-But this is 
smaller than G, contradicting our assumptions about 
o. It follows that for all eJ, we have o(eJ, e�) = Om+2· 
Now, let s = {jlo(e], ef) = O j }. We claims is a solu­
tion to the KNAPSACK instance. First, observe that 
the expected utility that agent 2 gets from misrepre­
senting its type as e� when it is really e? is w - c. 
Thus, in order for agent 2 not to have an incentive to 
do this, we must have I:: 1(7W 2 W- C. 
Jlo(8J ,OiJ=o,..+l 
But the left-hand side of the inequality is smaller or 
equal to I:; WJ- It follows that I:: Wj 2 W- C, 
jEf-S jEl-S 
or I:: WJ :::; C. Second, the expected social welfare is 
jES 
at most 2wv + l I:: �W + l I:: �(2!.1.. + l)W = 2 2 jE/ -S W 2 jES W w; 
WV + � + � I:; vj. But by our assumptions on 
jES 
the outcome function, we know that this must be 
greater or equal to G = WV + wiD. It follows that 
I:: VJ 2 D. So we have found a solution to the KNAP­
jES 
SACK instance. • 
4 Randomized mechanisms 
Randomized mechanisms are a generalization of de­
terministic mechanisms, and as such potentially allow 
one to increase the expectation of the (social) objec­
tive function. In this section we show that randomized 
mechanisms also allow one to circumvent the complex­
ity problems of deterministic mechanism design. 
Definition 8 Given a preference aggregation setting, 
a randomized mechanism is a function that, given any 
vector of reported types, produces a probability distri­
bution over the outcome set. That is, it is a function 
P: e 1 x e2 x .. . x eN_, pnosvisTs(o). 
We need to make only minor modifications to our def­
initions of solution concepts and the computational 
problem of mechanism design to accommodate for this 
generalization. In these definitions, Eo�p means that 
the expectation is taken when o is randomly chosen 
according to the distribution p. 
Definition 9 Given a preference aggregation set­
ting, a mechanism is said to implement its out­
come function in dominant strategies if truthtelling 
is always optimal even when the types reported by 
the other agents are already known. For a ran­
domized mechanism, this means that for any i E 
A 1 2 . N , for any type vector ( e , e , ... , e', . . . , e ) E 
e 1 X e2 X . . . X e i X . . . X eN, and for any 
{Ji E e i , we have Eo�p(8',8', ... ,8', ... ,8N)(u;(ei,o)) 2 
Eo�p(8',8', . .,{i•, ... ,ON) ( u;(ei, o)) 
Definition 10 Given a preference aggregation set­
ting, a mechanism is said to implement its outcome 
function in Bayes-Nash equilibrium if truthtelling is 
always optimal as long as the other agents' types 
are unknown, and the other agents report truth­
fully. For a randomized mechanism, this means 
that for any i E A, and for any e', {Ji E et, we 
have Ee-•( Eo<-p(e1,e2, ... ,e', ... ,eN)(u;(e',o))) 2 
( 1 2 "i N i Ee-•( Eo<-pe ,e , ... ,e, ... ,e )(u;(e,o))). 
Definition 1 1  (RANDOMIZED­
MECHANISM-DESIGN) We are given a 
preference aggregation setting, a solution concept, and 
an objective function g: e1 X e2 X ... X en X 0--> JR 
with a goal G. We are asked whether there exists a 
randomized mechanism for the preference aggregation 
setting which 
• satisfies the given solution concept, and 
• attains the goal, i.e. , 
Ee',e2, .. ,eN (E o�p(8' ,e', .. ,ON) (g(e1, e2, ... , eN, o))) 
2G. 
We now demonstrate how randomization in the mech­
anism allows us to compute optimal mechanisms 
much easier: we merely need to formulate the 
RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM-DESIGN instance as 
a linear program. For ease of exposition, we demon­
strate how to do this only in the two-agent case. How­
ever, the method readily generalizes to larger num­
bers of agents: the theorems below hold for any con­
stant number of agents. (As we indicated before, the 
description length of o is exponential in the number 
of agents, so this approach is tractable only for small 
numbers of agents.) 
Theorem 3 2-agent RANDOMIZED­
MECHANISM-DESIGN with dominant strategies 
implementation as the solution concept is solvable 
in polynomial time by linear programming, for any 
(polynomially computable) objective function. 
Proof: Let p:J denote the probability of choosing 
Ok when the reported types are t and e;. That is, 
P7J 
= (p(el, eJ))(ok)- These will be the variables that 
the linear program is to determine. Note there are 
polynomially many of them (le1lle2IIOI). We intro­
duce the following constraints in the linear program 
(corresponding to the requirements of implementation 
in dominant strategies): 
• For every BJ E e 2 , for every e},el E e 1 , we have 
I:: p:Ju1(et,ok) 2 I:: p�Ju1(et,ok); k'o• EO k'o• EO 
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• For every II{ E 81, for every IIJ, II[ E 82, we have 
I: P�Ju2(11J,ok) 2: I: P71u2(11J,ok)· k:ok EO k:o�.; EO 
Finally, we seek to maximize the following expression 
(which is the expectation of the objective function): 
Note that all the expressions are indeed linear in the 
p�J, and there is a polynomial number of inequalities 
(J81 J2 J82J + J81JJ82f). • 
Theorem 4 2-agent RANDOMIZED­
MECHANISM-DESIGN with Bayes-Nash imple­
mentation as the solution concept is solvable in 
polynomial time by linear programming, for any 
(polynomially computable) objective function. 
Proof: The p�J are as before. We introduce the follow­
ing constraints in the linear program (corresponding 
to the requirements of implementation in Bayes-Nash 
equilibirum): 
• For every II{, !if E 81, 
I: I: P2(11JJptul(ll{, ok) j:&JE82 k:okEO 
I: I: P2(11]Jptul(ll{,ok); 
j:9JE82 k:okEO 
• For every t!J, llf E 82, 
I: I: Pl(li{)p�Ju2(11J,ok) i:Bf E81 k:ok EO 
I: I: Pl(lit)p71u2(11J,ok)· i:BJ E81 k:ok EO 
we have 
> 
we have 
> 
Again, we seek to maximize the following expression: 
• I: I: I: Pl(li{)p2(11J)p�Jg(li{,IIJ,ok)· i:BJE81 j:8JE82 k:okEO 
Note that all the expressions are indeed linear in the 
P�j, and there is a polynomial number of inequalities 
(J81J2 + J82J2). • 
5 Increasing economic efficiency 
through randomization-a 
connection to computational 
complexity 
It is known in game theory that allowing for ran­
domization in the mechanism can increase expected 
social welfare (or other objective functions). Inter­
estingly, our results from above would prove this 
fact through connections to computational complex­
ity, if P # NP. For suppose it were never pos­
sible to increase social welfare via randomization. 
Then, since randomized mechanisms are a general­
ization of deterministic mechanisms, it would follow 
that the expected social welfare from the best random­
ized mechanism would equal the expected social wel­
fare from the best deterministic mechanism. There­
fore, to solve a DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM­
DESIGN instance, we could simply solve the cor­
responding RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM-DESIGN 
instance. But we have shown that for some so­
lution concepts, DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM­
DESIGN is NP-complete while RANDOMIZED­
MECHANISM-DESIGN is in P. So, we could con­
clude that P = NP.3 
The fact that randomization in the mechanism can 
increase expected social welfare is also easy to prove 
directly, as the following example shows. Let there 
be 3 outcomes: o1, 02, and 03. Agent 1 has 2 types 
(both equally likely), IIi and IIi. Agent 2 only has 
1 type, llf, The utility functions are as follows: for 
agent 1, u1(11i,ol) = 1; u1(1ii,o2) = 2; u1(lli,o3) = 0; 
u1(11i,ol) = 8; u1(lli,o2) = 2; and u1(lli,o3) = 0. 
For agent 2, u2(1i�,ol) = 0; u2(1i�,o2) = 0; and u2(tlf,o3) = 4. Because there is only one agent who 
has more than one type, implementation in dominant 
strategies and in Bayes-Nash equilibrium (and indeed 
all reasonable solution concepts) coincide. It is easy 
to show that the deterministic mechanism that max­
imizes social welfare among the nonmanipulable ones 
iJ given by o(ll},ll?) = o2; o(ll21,11�) = o1, for an ex­
pected social welfare of 5. (Every mechanism that does 
not choose 01 when agent 1 has type Iii will have ex­
pected social welfare no greater than 4. If the mecha­
nism does choose o1 in this case, we cannot choose 03 
in the case where agent 1 has type II(, because agent 
1 would have an incentive to misreport type Iii when 
its true type is IIi. So, the best the mechanism can do 
is to select o2 in this case.) However, if we allow for 
randomization even just in the case where agent 1 has 
type IIi, we can do better by choosing 02 with prob­
ability �, and o3 with probability �. (This gives an 
expected social welfare of 5 �, and there is no incentive 
for agent 1 to manipulate because the expected utility 
that it gets from reporting truthfully in the case where 
its type is II} is 1-which is the same as it would get 
by misreporting IIi.) 
6 Related research 
While we are, to our knowledge, the first to study the 
computational complexity of mechanism design, there 
has been a significant amount of research on other as­
pects of computing in games. For example, there has 
3This type of argument can also be used in many other 
settings where a shift from integer programming to linear 
programming makes the computational problem easier. 
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been considerable work on finding equilibria in games. 
AI work on this topic has focused on novel knowledge 
representations which, in certain settings, can drasti­
cally speed up equilibrium finding (e.g. [11-13]). 
A recent stream studies the complexity of executing 
mechanisms: voting mechanisms [4], combinatorial 
auctions (e.g. [18]), and other optimal and approxi­
mate mechanisms (e.g. [17]). 
Another research stream has focused on determining 
the computational complexity of manipulating mech­
anisms, with the goal of designing mechanisms where 
constructing a beneficial manipulation is hard [2, 3, 6]. 
Yet another stream has focused on games where the 
agents need to compute their preferences, and have 
limited computing available. In that setting, compu­
tational complexity actually affects the equilibrium, 
not merely the complexity of finding one [14, 15]. 
7 Conclusions and future research 
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central 
problem in multiagent systems, be the agents human 
or artificial. The key difficulty is that the coordinator, 
who tries to aggregate the preferences, is uncertain 
about the agents' preferences a priori, and the agents 
may report their preferences insincerely. 
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of 
the game so that the agents are motivated to report 
their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable 
outcome is chosen. We proposed an approach where a 
mechanism is automatically created for the preference 
aggregation setting at hand. This approach can be 
used even in settings that do not satisfy the assump­
tions of general classical mechanisms. It may also yield 
better mechanisms (in terms of stronger nonmanipula­
bility guarantees and/ or better social outcomes) than 
the classical mechanisms. Finally, it may allow one to 
circumvent impossibility results (such as the Gibbard­
Satterthwaite theorem) which state that there is no 
mechanism that is desirable across all preferences. 
The downside is that the mechanism design optimiza­
tion problem needs to be solved anew each time. Fo­
cusing on settings where side payments are not pos­
sible, we showed that the mechanism design problem 
is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms. This 
holds both for dominant-strategy implementation and 
for Bayes-Nash implementation. We then showed that 
if we allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanism 
design problem becomes solvable in polynomial time 
in both cases. In other words, the coordinator can 
tackle the computational complexity introduced by its 
uncertainty about the agents' preferences by making 
the agents face additional uncertainty. This comes at 
no loss, and in some cases at a gain, in the (social) 
objective. 
Future research includes extending the approach of 
automated mechanism design to settings where side 
payments are viable but the classical general mecha­
nisms do not work (for example because the agents 
do not have quasilinear preferences or additional re­
quirements are posed, such as strong budget balance). 
Another interesting use of automated mechanism de­
sign is to solve for mechanisms for a variety of settings 
(real or artificially generated), and to see whether gen­
eral mechanisms (or mechanism design principles) can 
be inferred. Yet another direction is to study auto­
mated mechanism design in settings where the agents' 
preferences have special structure, allowing for more 
concise input representation, and perhaps also more 
efficient mechanism design algorithms. 
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